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Derivative actions in modern company law play a crucial role in protecting shareholders and 
promoting the soundness of corporate governance. However, since China’s inauguration of 
derivative action there have been complications surrounding cost-related issues, especially 
for joint stock limited liability companies. This article focuses on a key element of the 
derivative action mechanism in China, namely the litigation fee. Despite the fact that fee-
related issues have been addressed in the recent Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court 
on Some Issues about the Application of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(IV), the provisions failed to address some important aspects in detail, especially in relation 
to a more effective system for the filing and attorneys’ fees. In order to maximize the 
effectiveness of derivative action and help the mechanism reach its full potential, it is crucial 
to make sure that litigation costs are tailored to a level that does not discourage shareholders 
from bringing these actions. This article aims to address the following related questions: are 
current fee-oriented stipulations in China hindering the effectiveness of derivative action? If 
so, could Chinese Company Law learn from legislative experiences from the UK, the US, and 
Japan to address the problem of insufficient incentives for shareholders to bring derivative 
actions? Through doctrinal and comparative analysis, we will explore the possibilities of 
establishing a more effective approach unique to China, considering its shareholding 
structure, corporate law, juridical system, culture, history, legal profession, and professional 
ethics. A fixed filing fee approach and a contingency fee arrangement supported by a common 
fund and substantial tests are proposed. 
“The biggest problem of derivative actions in China is not too many lawsuits, but too few of 
them.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The “proper claimant rule” has been established as a key principle of corporate law since 
Foss v. Harbottle,2 holding that if a company has a cause for action against someone, then 
the company itself and no one else must bring proceedings in relation to that cause of action. 
Shareholder derivative action is an exception to this general rule, and this mechanism is 
 
 1. JUNHAI LIU (刘俊海), XIANDAI GONGSI FA (现代公司法) [MODERN CORPORATION LAW], 412 (3rd ed., 
2015). (<我国当前面临的最大问题不是股东代表诉讼太多了，而是股东代表诉讼太少了>)  
 2. Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189. 
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provided for in common law and via a scheme for statutory derivative proceedings.3 This 
scheme has been seen as a useful tool to both mitigate the dominant power of controlling 
shareholders and curb opportunistic behaviors by boards of directors.4 Following this trend, 
derivative action was introduced to China with high expectations in Article 151 of the CCL 
2005, in the form of a short provision:  
[T]he shareholders in the case of a limited liability company, or a shareholder that 
has independently held, or the shareholders that have held in aggregate, 1% or 
more of the shares of the company for more than 180 consecutive days in the case 
of a company limited by shares, may request in writing the board of supervisors  
. . . to institute proceedings with the people’s court; where the supervisors fall 
under the circumstance set forth in Article 150 hereof, the foregoing shareholders 
may request in writing the board of directors or, the executive directors, in the case 
of a limited liability company without a board of directors, to institute proceedings 
with the people’s court.5 
 This provision was wholly preserved in the 2013 Company Law reform and remains in 
full force today.6 The focus of this Article is on the cost element of such actions in China, 
which may deter the commencement of proceedings. The enactment of the derivative action 
mechanism is expected to be actively and effectively applied by shareholders to protect their 
legitimate interests.  
The most regularly suggested reason for the scarcity of derivative litigation in China is 
the absence of incentives to bring such lawsuits.7 The rule in Foss v. Harbottle is said to be 
“essentially an issue of costs.”8 The litigation cost is described as “a major obstacle” when 
“minority shareholder[s] bring[] a derivative action on behalf of [a] company.”9 Prospective 
claimants may consider a few issues, including the size of the litigation fee at stake, the legal 
costs, and the likelihood of success in deciding whether to advance a lawsuit.10 Logically 
speaking, litigation would only be rational where the sums recoverable and the chances of 
success exceed the costs of legal expenses and the probability of losing the action. The unique 
nature of derivative actions, as legal actions on behalf of companies that indirectly benefit the 
claimants, makes it even more important to make sure the funding issue does not hinder the 
initiation of litigation against wrongdoing directors or majority shareholders.  
 
 3. Edwards v. Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (UK). The scheme has also been adopted in the US, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Ghana, South Africa and Singapore. 
 4. See STOYAN TENEV ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ENTERPRISE REFORM IN CHINA: BUILDING 
THE INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN MARKETS 148-49 (World Bank and the International Finance Corporation) (2002) 
(discussing enforcement of the rights of minority investors). 
 5.  Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong. Dec. 28, 1993, effective Mar. 1, 2014) art. 151. 
 6.  Id. 
 7. Hui Huang, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis, 
27 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 619, 650 (2012). 
 8. D.D. Prentice, Wallersteiner v. Moir: The Demise of the Rule in Foss v Harbottle? 40 CONV. & PROP. 
LAW. 51, 58 (1976). 
 9. ARAD REISBERG, DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORY AND OPERATION 222 
(2007). 
 10. Huang, supra note 7, at 646. 
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Since the implementation of the Chinese Company Law 2005, almost all claimants in 
derivative action cases have been shareholders in limited liability companies (LLCs).11 There 
has been only four lawsuits brought by shareholders of a joint stock liability company 
(JSLC)). Three of them were bought in unlisted JSLCs.12 There is only one unreported case 
in listed JSLC,  which was subsequently accepted by the Shandong Higher People’s Court on 
December 11th, 2009 with a fixed hearing date of January 29th, 2010.13 However, the board 
of Sanlian Group raised a jurisdiction objection because this was the first case of derivative 
action in China for shareholders in JSLCs, with a high damages claim of 50 million Yuan.14 
The board argued that the Supreme People’s Court was the appropriate jurisdiction for the 
case. However, this request was rejected by the SPC, and subsequently the Shangdong Court 
suspended the case because the result of the case depended on the trial of another case.   It 
implies that shareholders in JSLCs are either extremely reluctant or have encountered 
significant difficulties in bringing cases of litigation on behalf of their companies. The 
derivative action legal mechanism has been criticized as “no more than window dressing . . . 
for shareholders in JSLCs in China.”15 This article critically evaluates the effectiveness of the 
mechanism and explore the possibilities of encouraging shareholders to raise cases by 
introducing reduced, more predictable fees, probably from other sources. 
In terms of difficulties, issues such as the appropriateness of thresholds, including 
shareholding period and shareholding ownership percentage requirements, have been 
discussed elsewhere.16  The unique nature of derivative action means the incentives for 
bringing these actions are challenging, since the mechanism allows shareholders to bring 
lawsuits as nominal claimants, while the company is the actual claimant in terms of the 
fundamental interests of successful litigation.17 In other words, the shareholder as claimant 
could benefit from a slice of the success of a derivative action based on the fact that the value 
of his or her shares may grow pro rata as the assets of the company increase leading to 
hypothetical benefits.  Nevertheless, disproportionate and inappropriate litigation fees may 
affect the popularity of derivative actions, especially among those who own relatively low 
percentages of shares and who may have limited resources, information, and voice in the 
 
 11. Id. at 631. 
12 Gushanhua yinsu xianggang shengxun qiye youxian gongsi、zhenjiang babaiban shangmao  youxian gongsi 
ji disanren Zhenjiang baihuo gufen youxian gongsi sunhai gongsi liyi an (2016) Suminzhong 217 Hao (顾善华因诉
香港盛迅企业有限公司、镇江八佰伴商贸 有限公司及第三人镇江百货股份有限公司损害公司利益案（2016）
苏民终 217号) [(Gu Shanhua v Hong Kong Shengxun Enterprise Co., Ltd. et al. (SuMinZhong No. 217) ]; Yuangao 
kaiming jianzhudeng yu beigao huangdayindeng sunhai gongsi liyian (2017) Yu 0110 Minchu9690 hao (原告凯明
建筑等与被告黄达银等损害公司利益案 (2017) 渝 0110 民初 9690 号) [Kaiming Construction et al. v Huang 
Dayin et al. (2017 Yu 0110 MinChu No. 9690 )]; Yuangao huangcongfudeng yu beigao huangrunguodeng sunhai 
gongsi liyi zeren jiufen yi an (2016) Xiang 1022 Minchu 711 Hao (原告黄丛付等与被告黄润国等损害公司利益
责任纠纷一 案（ 2016）湘 1022民初 711号) [Huang Congfu et al. v Huang Runguo et al. (2016, Xiang 1022 
MinChu No. 711)]  
 13. Huangweihongdeng su shandong sanlian jituan youxian zeren gongsi qinfan shangbiaozhuanyongquan 
jiufenguanxiaquan yiyian (2010) Minsanzhongzidi 5 Hao (黄伟宏等诉山东三联集团有限责任公司侵犯商标专
用权纠纷管辖权异议案 (2010) 民三终字第 5 号) [Huang Hongwei et al. v. Shangdong Sanlian Group (2010 
MinsanZhongZi No. 5)]. The case involves an attempt by the claimants, seventy-eight shareholders of Sanlian 
Shangshe, to bring a derivative claim against the former controlling shareholder. 
 14.  Id. 
 15. Jingchen Zhao & Shuangge Wen, The Eligibility of Claimants to Commerce Derivative Litigation on 
Behalf of China’s Joint Stock Limited Companies, 48 H.K.L.J. 687, 694 (2018). 
 16. See id. (detailing eligibility of shareholders in LLCs and JSLCs to bring derivative action). 
 17. SHAOWEI LIN, DERIVATIVE ACTION IN CHINESE COMPANY LAW 175 (2015). 
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company as a result.18 Therefore, these fee-related issues are strong disincentives for claimant 
shareholders to launch derivative actions.  
Unlike in common law countries such as the UK, where inadequacies may be alleviated 
by case law19 and corresponding procedure rules,20 the legislative legal basis of the legal costs 
of derivative action in China rest on the Civil Procedure Law 1992, Measures for the 
Administration of Attorneys’ Fee 2006, supplemented by the Provisions of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Some Issues about the Application of the Company Law of the People’s 
Republic of China IV (Provision IV).21 The usual rule is that the losing party will be ordered 
by the court to pay the winning party’s case acceptance fee, the fee charged by the court that 
tries the case, while each party pays its own attorney’s fees and other expenses.22 Provision 
IV provides that the company should indemnify a shareholder who brings a derivative action 
directly, or the claim should be partially or fully supported by the People’s Court.23   
It is crucial to make sure that litigation costs are tailored to a level that does not further 
discourage shareholders from bringing these actions so that the scheme can “reach its full 
potential.”24 Constructive and feasible proposals are in urgent need to address problems of 
fee-related issues. This article aims to address three inter-related and incremental questions: 
are current fee-oriented stipulations in China hindering the effectiveness and enforcement of 
derivative action in China? If so, could Chinese Company Law learn from legislative 
experiences from the UK, the US, and Japan to address the problem of insufficient incentives 
for minority shareholders to bring derivative actions? More importantly, should China 
directly transplant a proven, successful, and academically grounded legislative exercise? Or 
should a unique approach be adopted in China considering its unique shareholding structure, 
corporate law, juridical system, culture, history, legal profession, political, and social 
institutions, and professional ethics of lawyers and judges? A complex interplay between a 
transplant process and socio-cultural forces may well cause the transplant process to be far 
from straightforward. This Article aims to establish a balanced and effective approach, 
 
 18. See Wei-qi Cheng, Protection of Minority Shareholders after the New Company Law: 26 Case Studies, 52 
INT’L J. L. & MGMT. 283, 285 (2010) (“hurdles that minority shareholders may have to overcome when they decide 
to lodge a direct or a derivative action such as the difficulty of collecting crucial evidence and the huge litigation 
fees that shareholders may have to pay”); see also Benjamin Liebman, Class Action Litigation in China, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1998) (discussing the use of class actions in the Chinese legal system and the associated fees 
and costs). 
 19. See, e.g., Wallersteiner v. Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 All ER 849 at 850 (Eng.); Carlisle & Cumbria United 
Independent Supporters’ Society Ltd. v. CUFC Holdings Ltd. [2010] EWCA (Civ) 463 [12–29]; Stainer v. Lee 
[2010] EWHC (Ch) 1539 [30-55]. 
 20. Civil Procedure Rules 1980, c. 58 (Eng.), http://justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil 
/rules/part19#text1. 
 21. Measures for the Administration of Attorneys’ Fees, Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 5, 2016, effective Sept. 1, 
2017. 
 22.  Susong Feiyong Jiaona Banfa (诉讼费用交纳办法) [Measure on Payment of Litigation] (2007), art. 29 
(China).  
 23. Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shiyong  <zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongsi fa> ruogan wenti de 
guiding (si) (最高人民法院关于适用＜中华人民共和国公司法＞若干问题的规定（四)) [Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues about the Application of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (IV)], art. 26. 
 24. Hui Huang, The Statutory Derivative Action in China: Critical Analysis and Recommendations for 
Reform, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 227, 248 (2007). 
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through theoretical and comparative analysis, in order to eliminate the obstacles that hinder 
the smooth operation of derivative action and protect the interests of the company and 
shareholders.  
This original comparative attempt may enhance our knowledge and understanding of 
the topic and improve the utility of derivative action in China.25 The research is important in 
putting forward proposals to alter the situation whereby a shareholder “has nothing to gain 
but much to lose.”26 The research is significant in terms of enabling healthy numbers of 
shareholders to launch derivative suits against companies, especially among minority 
shareholders in JSLCs. These questions should be an essential primer for legal practitioners, 
in-house counsel, shareholders, members of supervisory boards, and legal theorists who are 
working in the field—not only in China but also globally. Since the initiation of China’s “One 
Belt, One Road” (OBOR) intercontinental trade and infrastructure initiative in 2013, 
shareholder protection, including for foreign investors, has become a significant issue beyond 
the domestic market, with international implications and impact.27  
First, I will critically review the how fee-related issues in derivative actions can protect 
shareholders. Then I will turn to the Japanese approach to filing fees. Japan was chosen in 
relation to this discussion since a sliding scale mechanism was originally adopted in China 
mirroring the conventional Japanese approach. However, reform has taken place since the 
Nikko Securities case in Japan,28 and the new approach has not been followed in China. Then 
I shall look at the US and the UK approaches respectively. The Chinese and US systems take 
a similar approach to attorneys’ fees. The UK system in Commonwealth countries includes a 
few jurisdictions in that share similar geographical locations and cultures with China such as 
Singapore and Hong Kong. The approach, which has encouraged derivative action and been 
applied effectively by shareholders, will be particularly discussed. Finally, I will develop the 
most suitable approach for China, discussing multi-dimensional factors.  
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FEE ISSUE TO PROMOTE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
DERIVATIVE ACTION 
The critical issue in relation to corporate governance in China rests on how to enhance 
legal deterrence.29 With the inherently weak public enforcement of law in China and the 
incomplete picture of private enforcement mechanisms such as securities fraud class action, 
derivative action is a mechanism which carries high expectations from both government and 
shareholders in order to enhance corporate governance in China. 30 Derivative action, as a 
legal deterrent, should be given a prominent position. A unique feature of this deterrent is that 
the claimant does not enjoy relief and compensation from the litigation directly. Instead, 
 
 25. MATHIAS M. SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 3-4 (2nd ed. 2018). 
 26. Wallersteiner v. Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 All ER 849 (Eng.). 
 27. Foreign direct investment grew the most in 2018 and 2019 and was up 5.8% year-on-year to 941.5 billion 
yuan ($136.71 billion) in 2019. China says its foreign direct investments increased 5.8% in 2019 () see 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/21/china-says-its-foreign-direct-investments-increased-5point8percent-in-
2019.html, CNBC (Jan. 20, 2020). 
28. Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Mar. 30, 1993, 101 SHIRYŌBAN SHŌJI 70 (Japan). 
 29. See generally Zhong Zhang, Legal Deterrence: The Foundation of Corporate Governance—Evidence 
from China, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L. REV. 741 (2007). 
 30. See Qiao Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic Effects, and Institutional 
Determinants, 52 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 415-16 (describing the weak public enforcement of law in China). 
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recoveries from the action will go to the company.31 Furthermore, derivative action may add 
additional burdens to companies. 32  Companies may suffer collateral harm, including 
monetary and non-monetary harms such as unwanted publicity disclosures and negative long-
term reputation damage, which could outweigh any gains from the litigation.33  
In addition to these obstacles, funding issues are central to encouraging eligible and 
sincere shareholders to bring legitimate actions, in order to promote the long-term interests 
of the company. The mechanism’s effectiveness in constraining managerial misconduct is 
highly doubtful if these obstacles cannot be removed. These unique lawsuits brought by 
claimants will encounter obstacles to its initiation if we cannot position appropriate and 
reasonable rules to settle funding issues. 
The cost of litigation is not a problem for derivative action in China alone. It is an issue 
in a number of jurisdictions due to the nature of the litigation, and related rules will have a 
direct impact on the popularity of this type of action. For example, private shareholder actions 
are an integral part of corporate governance in the US because the rules governing litigation 
costs promote lawsuits.34  However, this is not the case in the UK, where the litigation costs 
rules discourage lawsuits.35  
UK, US, and Japan are chosen to act as examples here due to the fact that these three 
jurisdictions represent three main approaches in practice to deal with issues surrounding 
funding derivative actions. 36 Another reason that these jurisdictions have been selected is that 
derivative actions are relatively popular in the US, UK, and Japan. In UK the popularity of 
derivative actions is reflected in the proportion of cases at public companies versus those with 
private companies, which is a major concern in China in relation to JSLCs.37 However, it 
should be noted that more well-adjusted figures in other jurisdictions could be regarded as 
the result of multiple factors, such as mitigated thresholds through legal reforms, litigation 
costs, and court permission as a threshold.  
In Japan, where the shareholding percentage is not a requirement for bringing a 
derivative action, derivative actions involving publicly held companies have exceeded those 
involving closed companies since 1993.38 It is reported that 119 derivative actions were 
brought against listed companies in Japan from 1993 to 2009.39 In the US, many cases involve 
 
 31. See Spokes v. The Grosvenor & W End Ry. Terminus Hotel Co. Ltd. [1897] 2 Q.B. 124 (UK); Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd No 2 [1982] 2 Q.B. 221 (UK) (holding that recoveries must be 
distributed to companies). 
 32. Id. 
 33. REISBERG, supra note 9, at 47–48. 
34.  John Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the US and UK, 
6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 689, 690 (2009). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Jingchen Zhao, A More Efficient Derivative Action System in China: Challenges and Opportunities 
through Corporate Governance Theory, 64 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 233, 243 (2013). 
 37. See Wendy Wu, China’s top state-run firms told to become joint stock corporations by year’s end, SOUTH 
CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2104239 
/chinas-top-state-run-firms-told-become-joint-stock-corporations (describing efforts made by the Chinese 
government to increase the presence of JSPC’s and thereby attract a greater number of private investors). 
 38. Shiro Kawashima & Susumu Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan, Law, Practice and 
Suggested Reforms, STAN. J. INT’L L. 9, 21 (1997). 
 39. Dan W. Puchniak & Masafumi Nakahigashi, Japan’s Love for Derivative Actions: Irrational Behavior and 
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public companies. The empirical research conducted by Tompson and Thomas showed that 
derivative actions against listed firms have been regarded as a common issue historically, 
based on research on a sample of 535 public corporations.40 In the limited evidence from the 
UK, three cases,41 namely Bridge v. Daley,42 Eckerle v. Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH,43 
and BNP Paribas SA v. Open Joint Stock Company Russian Machines,44 have involved public 
companies.  
II. THE CURRENT LAW FOR COURT FEES FOR DERIVATIVE ACTION IN CHINA 
AND THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Chinese civil procedure has not been directly transplanted from any mainstream 
legislative approach, such as the approaches used in UK, US, Japan, or in Taiwan, which has 
a quasi-public foundation with the function of bringing such actions.45 The fundamental rule 
currently applied in Chinese civil procedure is that the loser pays the court fees, whereas the 
attorneys’ fees are borne by their respective parties.46 This is also confirmed in the sample 
study by Clarke and Howson of fifty cases in China, which showed that court fees are 
generally allocated to the loser, while it failed to reveal how attorneys’ fees are allotted 
between the parties.47   
Current Chinese law and regulations on both civil litigation filing fees and attorneys’ 
fees have been factors that deter shareholders from bringing derivative claims on behalf of 
companies.48 As far as court fees are concerned, the rule on these fees is set by the Measure 
 
Non-Economic Motives as Rational Explanations for Shareholder Litigation, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 69 
(2012). 
 40. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 59 
(1991); see Robert Thompson & Randall Thomas, The Public and the Private Faces of Derivate Lawsuits, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1749 (2004) (describing general outcomes of derivative lawsuits); see also Caremark Int’l 
Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, 
825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re The 
Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d. 27, 62-67 (Del. 2006) (providing more concrete examples 
of derivative lawsuits and judicial interpretations). 
 41. See Andrew Keay, Assessing Rethinking the Statutory Scheme for Derivative Action under the Companies 
Act 2006, 16 J. CORP. L. STUD. 39, 41 (2016) (noting that since the enforcement of Section 260 of the Companies 
Act 2006 on October 1, 2007, the regime of derivative action has not been used and that 22 derivative actions were 
instituted up to September 2015); see also Brannigan v. Style [2016] EWHC 512 (CH) (citing to the only other 
reported case up to June 2016). Twenty-three derivative actions have been instituted up to June 2016. 
 42. Bridge v. Daley [2015] EWHC 2121 (UK). 
 43. Eckerle v. Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH [2013] EWHC 68 (CH) (UK). 
 44. BNP Paribas S.A. v. Open Joint Stock Co. Russian Machines [2011] EWHC (Comm)308[1] (UK).  In this 
case, the first defendant, Open Joint Stock Company Russian Machines, and the second defendant, Joint Stock 
Asset Management Company Ingosstrakh-Investments, are Russian companies. 
 45. See Wang Ruu Tseng & Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, Derivative Actions in Taiwan: Legal and Cultural 
Hurdles with a Glimmer of Hope for the Future, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 215, 240–241 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012) (discussing the role of the government-
sanctioned Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center (SFIPC) in Taiwanese derivative actions). 
 46. Susong Feiyong Jiaona Banfa (诉讼费用交纳办法) [Measure on Payment of Litigation] (2007), arts. 6, 
29 (China). 
 47. Donald C. Clarke & Nicholas C. Howson, Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Action 
in the People’s Republic of China, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 243, 287 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012). 
 48. Id. at 258–259. 
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on Payment of Litigation (Susong Feiyong Jiaona Banfa) 2007.49 Court fees consist of filing 
fees, application fees and court expenses.50 In detail, filing fees (case acceptance fees) are the 
fees that every claimant needs to pay within seven days upon a notification issued by the 
court.51 Application fees are the expenses of applying for the enforcement of judgement and 
mediation by the People’s Court and taking preservation measures, such as a payment 
warrant, a public summons, or insolvency, among others.52 Court expenses include “the travel 
expenses, accommodation expenses, living expenses, and subsidies for missed work, which 
are incurred by witnesses, authenticators, interpreters, and adjustment makers for their 
appearance in the People’s Court on designated dates.”53 
In practice, application fees and court expenses are charged based on the amounts that 
are incurred. Such fees are generally low, and they are not the concern of this article.54 
However, according to Article 29 of the Measure, a major part of the cost of the litigation is 
the case filing fee, which is based on the “loser pays” rule. 55  In the scenario of a derivative 
action, if a shareholder wins the case, he or she could recover the fees from the company. 
However, if the lawsuit is unsuccessful, the shareholders may have to bear the costs 
personally. This is confirmed by Provision IV, which clarifies that companies will only 
indemnify shareholders in claims that are partially or entirely supported by the Court. 56 
Furthermore, reasonable costs in Provision IV may not include the filing fee.57 The filing fee 
is calculated in two ways according to the nature of the case, based on whether the case is a 
litigation against a property claim.58 Where the nature of the claim is property-oriented with 
a monetary nature, a sliding scale will be adopted, whereas a fixed fee will be charged for 
non-property claims that are not monetary in nature.59 Derivative actions may be seen as 
litigation brought by shareholders on behalf of companies for damages when the board of 
directors or majority shareholders engage in misconduct.60 In such derivative actions a sliding 
scale is adopted.61  
This approach is similar to the litigation calculation rules adopted in Japan before the 
1993 Commercial Code, where a sliding scale system was adopted.62 This means that the 
 
49.  Susong Feiyong Jiaona Banfa (诉讼费用交纳办法) [Measure on Payment of Litigation], art. 6, 2007. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. art. 22. 
 52. Id. art. 10. 
 53. Id. art. 6(3). 
 54. SHAOWEI LIN, DERIVATIVE ACTIONS IN CHINESE COMPANY LAW 128 (2015). 
 55. Susong Feiyong Jiaona Banfa (诉讼费用交纳办法) [Measures on the Payment of Litigation Costs] 
(promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 7 2006, effective Apr. 1, 2007) art. 29, ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Dec. 19, 2006, 
http:// www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-12/29/content_483407.htm (China). 
56.   
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Susong Feiyong Jiaona Banfa (诉讼费用交纳办法) [Measure on Payment of Litigation], art. 13, 2007. 
59.  Id. art. 13 (1)-(5) 
 60.  Harald Baum & Dan W. Puchniak, The Derivative Action: An Economic, Historical, and Practice-
Oriented Approach, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 7–8 
(Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012). 
61.  Susong Feiyong Jiaona Banfa (诉讼费用交纳办法) [Measure on Payment of Litigation], art. 13, 2007. See 
also GIOVANNI PISACANE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA: THE STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN-
INVESTED ENTERPRISES UNDER CHINESE LAW (2017) 
 62.  See Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 355 (2001) 
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litigation fee is charged in proportion to the amount of damage the plaintiffs seek in the claim. 
According to Article 13(1) of the Measure, renminbi (RMB) 50 shall be paid for each case 
seeking damages of no more than RMB 10,000.63 After the initial RMB 10,000, different 
percentages (starting at 2.5%) of the damages sought (starting from amounts between RMB 
10,000 and 100,000) will be charged for different damage amounts.64 The lowest percentage 
of 0.5% will be charged for damages of more than RMB 20 million.65 In derivative actions, 
the claimants may have to pay huge amounts in litigation fees if the claimed damages are 
high. This is particularly likely to be the case for listed companies due to their size, 
capitalization and the seriousness of potential damages caused by directors’ misconduct. In a 
hypothetical but realistic case, a claim of RMB 25 million will result in a fee of RMB 125,000 
(approximately US dollar (USD) 17,000), which seems unreasonable and unaffordable for a 
shareholder, especially for a minority shareholder or a group of minority shareholders, in a 
collective action. If the court supports the claim, either fully or partially, at the first instance 
and no appeal is raised by the defendant, the shareholder could recover the fees from the 
defendant.  This may not be the end of the journey for the court fees, however, because the 
plaintiff shareholder may still need to pay an additional sum of RMB 25,000 for the 
enforcement of the judgment.66 In Zhejiang Hexin Electricity Power Development Ltd (浙江
和信电力开发有限公司), the shareholders’ claim resulted in total court fees of RMB 
1,802,760 (approximately USD 255,701). 67 In Zhongqi qihuo jingji youxian gongsi (中期期
货经纪有限公司) a claim of more than RMB 164 million (approximately USD 23.5 million) 
resulted in a litigation fee of RMB 830,000 (approximately USD 117,000).68 Clearly, this fee 
would be extremely difficult for shareholders to pay if they were not financially solvent.  
Another controversial case concerning the high cost of litigation is Hongshi Shiye 
youxian zeren gongsi (红石实业有限责任公司), in which the plaintiff lowered the amount 
of the claim because of the exorbitant litigation costs.69 In this case three individual litigant 
shareholders (Gang Wang, Guanxue Xie and Jun Yao), brought a litigation against Pan Shiyi, 
a major shareholder, CEO, general manager, and legal representative of the company. They 
claimed that he did not execute adequate due diligence in looking after the company’s assets. 
The filing fee was RMB 500,000 (approximately USD 71,000) based on their monetary 
 
(discussing how litigation fees based on a sliding scale posed a roadblock to shareholder litigation prior to 1993). 
63.  Susong Feiyong Jiaona Banfa (诉讼费用交纳办法) [Measure on Payment of Litigation], art. 13(1), 2007. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. art. 14(2) (stipulating that if the enforceable amount or price is not more than 10,000 Yuan, 50 Yuan 
shall be paid for each case; if from 10,000 Yuan up to 500,000 Yuan, the fee shall be paid at the rate of 1.5%; if 
from 500,000 Yuan up to 5 million Yuan, the fee shall be paid at the rate of 1%; if from 5 million Yuan up to 10 
million Yuan, the fee shall be paid at the rate of 0.5%; if more than 10 million Yuan, the fee shall be paid at the 
rate of 0.1%). 
 67. Zhejiang hexin dianli kaifa youxian gongsi, jinhuashi daxing wuzi youxian gongsi yu tonghe zhiye touzi 
youxian gongsi, guangsha konggu chuangye touzi youxian gongsi, shanghai fuwo qiye fazhan youxian gongsi 
sunhai gongsi quanyi jiufen shangsuan (2008) Min’er zhongzi di 123 hao (浙江和信电力开发有限公司、金华市
大兴物资有限公司与通和置业投资有限公司、广厦控股创业投资有限公司、上海富沃企业发展有限公司损
害公司权益纠纷上诉案 2008 (民二终字第 123号)) [Zhejiang Dianxin Electronic Development Ltd Co et al. v 
Tonghe Investment Property Ltd Co et al.] 2008 MinerZhongZi No. 123 (China). 
 68. JIMING ZHAO (赵继明) & GAOCHEN WU (吴高臣), ZHONGGUO LÜSHI BANAN QUANCHENG SHILU: 
GUDONG DAIBIAO SUSONG (中国律师办案全程实录: 股东代表诉讼) [CHINA LAWYER TODAY: DERIVATIVE 
ACTIONS] 229, 280 (Ping Jiang ed., 2007). 
 69. DONGJING LIU, STUDY ON SHAREHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE ACTIONS IN CHINA (我国股东派生诉讼制度研
究 103 (2011) (reporting that the amount claimed in this case is 105 million Yuan, but in fact the company’s real 
loss is at least ten times this number). 
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compensation claim of RMB 100.5 million.70 In the Sanlian Shangshe (三联商社) case of 
2009, the only case involving a group of shareholders in a JSLC bringing a derivative action, 
the litigation cost was also astonishingly high at RMB 191,800 (approximately USD 
27,203).71Despite the fact that the case acceptance fee is in principle reimbursable when the 
derivative action is successful,72 the need to pay in advance without knowledge of the result 
of the case could be a considerable hurdle in bringing such actions. Sometimes if the case is 
appealed, the claimants may need to pay on more than one occasion. For example, in the case 
Lin Cheng’en v. Li Jiangshan (林承恩与李江山等损害公司利益纠纷案),73 the filing fee 
for the first case was RMB 331,800 and the fee for the appeal was another RMB 331,800, 
totalling RMB 663,600 (approximately USD 94,126). This cost was borne by the shareholders 
when they initiated the case and later exercised their right to appeal.  
In addition to the uncertainties of court fees being recovered from the defendant if 
shareholders win the case, it has to be recognized that a limited number of plaintiff 
shareholders, especially minority shareholders in JSLCs, will have the financial capacity to 
pay for court fees even if they may be able to recover their money later on.74 As a result, their 
claim will be treated as withdrawn by the litigant. 75  Therefore, the derivative action 
mechanism will lose its compensatory function for shareholders and companies, as well as its 
deterrence function based on the significant reputational and financial consequences for 
directors or senior managers as defendants. 
In order to establish an enabling rather than hindering legal environment for legitimate 
plaintiffs to bring derivative actions, reform proposals should improve the current situation, 
by encouraging shareholders to exercise their right to initiate a derivative suit. It is sensible 
to look at the legislative experience in Japan that Chinese law is following in terms of sliding 
scale approach.  
The reform in Japanese law, predominantly the changes brought by the Nikko Securities 
case, have had an impact on the popularity and effectiveness of the mechanism.76 In Japan, 
 
 70. Yingcai (英才), Chuangye xiongdi fanmu panshiyi bei suopei 1yi (创业兄弟反目 潘石屹被索赔 1亿) 
[Entrepreneurial brothers turned against Pan Shiyi was claimed more than 100 million] 
https://business.sohu.com/20041025/n222676585.shtml Sohu (October 20, 2004); see also Global Times (环球房
产周刊), Dichan dawan zaoyu tianjia suopei panshiyi yiyuan guansi xianjiaozhe (地产大腕遭遇天价索赔 潘石屹
亿元官司陷胶着 ) [Real Estate Big Names Encountered Astronomical Claims: Pan Shiyi’s Billion Yuan Reminbi 
Lawsuit] http://biz.163.com/41126/4/164C5D4900020QEO.html (Nov. 25, 2004). 
 71.  See WENJING CHEN, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FUNDING SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION, 124 n.202 
(Springer 2017) (noting how Chinese courts do not publish all cases but the Sanlian Shangshe case was publicized 
in Chinese media, notifying the public of case details); see also Viroshan Poologasundram, Investing in China? 
Beware, if You are a Minority Shareholder: How Effective is the Derivative Action as a Protection Device for 
Minority Shareholders in China? 7 U. Puerto Rico Bus. L.J. 331, 349 n.83. 
 72. Susong Feiyong Jiaona Banfa (诉讼费用交纳办法) [Measure on Payment of Litigation], art. 29, 2007 
(China). 
 73. Linchengen yu lijiangshandeng sunhai gongsi liyi jiufenan (林承恩与李江山等损害公司利益纠纷案) 
[Lin Cheng’en v. Li Jiangshan] Min 4th Zhong Zi no.1 (Jiangxi Provincial Higher People’s Ct. 2012). 
      76.  LIN, supra note 54, at 131. 
 75. Unless the plaintiff shareholder is eligible for judicial aid according to one of the circumstances listed in 
Chapter 6 of the Administration of Attorney’s Fee 2006. 
 76. See Hiroshi Oda, Shareholder’s Derivative Action in Japan, 8 EUR. COMP. & FIN. L. REV. 334, 338 (2011) 
(characterizing the Nikko Securities case as a ground-breaking decision in the history of derivative action after the 
court accepted the plaintiff’s argument that the stamp duty was prohibitive and ruled that the stamp duty would be 
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the sliding scale system has historically proven to be a barrier to shareholder derivative 
claims,77 constituting “the real determining factor.”78 The story in Japan may be traced back 
to the earlier period before the reform of 1993, which provided the impetus for a palpable 
increase in derivative suits.79 Prior to 1993, shareholders needed to purchase an inshi (revenue 
stamp) before filing a derivative action.80 The claims were divided into two kinds based on 
their nature, which were categorized as “calculable” and “incalculable” claims.81  In the 
former case, the stamp fee was calculated based on a sliding scale dependent on the amount 
of claimed damages, and a normal fixed flat rate was charged in the latter case.82 The actual 
effect of the pre-1993 Japanese litigation fee principles was to discourage all suits due to the 
high litigation fees, which were not recoverable unless the shareholders eventually won the 
case.83 Statistics show that there were fewer than twenty derivative action suits between 1950 
and 1990, but there was a dramatic increase after 1993 to hundreds of lawsuits each year.84 It 
was reported that 119 derivative actions were brought against listed companies in Japan from 
1993 to 2009,85 and it is claimed that Japan has now started to imitate the litigious United 
States, where derivative actions are actively used.86 This increase could be a consequence of 
multiple reasons, but the fee issue is widely discussed and accepted as a very important one.87  
 
8,500 yen). 
 77. Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Lost Decade for Corporate Governance Reform? What has changed, what hasn’t, and 
why, in INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN JAPAN 100, 100 (Magnus Blomström & Summer La Croix eds., 2006); see also 
Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 
1436, 1458–1459 (1994) (discussing how attorney fees calculated using a sliding scale create a barrier to potential 
shareholder plaintiffs). 
 78. Tomotaka Fujita, Transformation of the Management Liability Regime in Japan in the Wake of the 1993 
Revision, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 15, 16 (Hideki Kanda et al. eds., 2008). 
 79. Shiro Kawashima & Susumu Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan: Law, Practice and 
Suggested Reforms, 33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 9, 11 (1997) (discussing how sliding scale-based litigation fees posed a 
roadblock to shareholder litigation prior to 1993). 
 80.  Id. at 19. 
 81.  Oda, supra note 76, at 338. See also Mark D West, Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan 
and the United States 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1436, 1464-1465 (1993-1994) 
 82. See Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 847, para. 6 (Japan) (describing the value of the 
subject matter of a suit that is not based on a property right claim); Minji Soshō Hiyō Tō Ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Act 
on Costs of Civil Procedure], Law No. 40 of 1971, art. 4, para. 2 (Japan) (describing the value of a suit that is not 
based on a property right claim to be 1,600,000 yen). 
 83. CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & MARK D. WEST, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
JAPAN: THE IMPACT OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES 21 (2004). 
 84. Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 352 (2001). 
 85. Masafumi Nakahigashi & Dan W. Puchniak, Land of the Rising Derivative Action: Revisiting Irrationality 
to Understand Japan’s Unreluctant Shareholder Litigant, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 128, 172 (Dan W. Puchniak, Harald Baum & Michael Ewing-Chow eds., 2012). 
 86.  Gen Goto, Growing Securities Litigation Against Issuers in Japan: Its Background and Reality 3 (2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2714252. 
 87. See, e.g., Hiroshi Oda, Shareholder’s Derivative Action in Japan, 8 EUR. COMP. & FIN. L. REV. 334, 337 
(2011) (explaining that prior to 1993 the cost of the derivative action was high); Mark D. West, Why Shareholders 
Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 352 (2001) (describing that Japanese shareholders prior to 
1993 had chosen not to sue in part because of high fees); Shiro Kawashima & Susumu Sakurai, Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation in Japan: Law, Practice and Suggested Reforms, 33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 9, 12 (1997) 
(explaining how the 1993 Commercial Code amendments lowered the filing fees for derivative actions and made 
the mechanism more accessible to shareholders). 
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This fundamental change, which came as an unexpected shock,88 started from the Nikko 
Securities case decisions by the Tokyo High Court, where the court supported the 
shareholders’ argument that the stamp fee for bringing a derivative action should be tailored 
to a fixed rate because the economic benefit to shareholders from derivative actions is in 
practice “incalculable.”89 The principle was subsequently confirmed by national legislation 
embedded in the amended Article 267 of the Commercial Code, in order to confirm that all 
derivative actions “shall be deemed to be lawsuits with respect to non-property claims for the 
calculation of the amount of the claim.”90 As a result, the cost of filing a derivative action as 
a non-property, non-calculable claim was reduced to a flat fixed fee of 8,200 Japanese Yen if 
the target of the litigation did not exceed 950,000 Yen.  In 2003, the filing fee was changed 
to a flat rate of 13,000 Yen if the target of the litigation does not exceed 1.6 million Yen.91 
This amended fee is obviously likely to be lower than the stamp fee, and this is regarded as 
one of the most influential events in Japanese corporate governance history.92 It is argued that 
the reform will improve the performance of Japanese firms in the long run and enhance the 
law’s disciplinary effects on management misconduct.93  
In China it was concluded through historical evidence related to case numbers that the 
current sliding system served as “a robust disincentive to prospective shareholders suing 
derivatively on behalf of the company.” 94  Therefore, it is worth considering partially 
transplanting the Japanese approach to China, in order to encourage shareholders in JSLCs to 
use derivative actions as effective shareholder remedies to safeguard the interests of 
companies. This is relevant due to the fact that the sliding scale system was first adopted 
following the approach in Japan, and the Japanese reform after the Nikko Securities case 
proved to be effective and positive in encouraging healthy numbers of derivative actions. The 
transplant of the fee rules is necessary and urgent to promote board accountability in China 
and open boards up to the supervision and scrutiny of shareholders. 95   Indeed, the only way 
to make monitoring effective is to provide sufficient financial rewards to compensate for 
mounting costs.96 Proposals have already been made to transplant the Japanese rule for filing 
 
 88. Tomotaka Fujita, Transformation of the Management Liability Regime in Japan in the Wake of the 1993 
Revision, in Transforming Corporate Governances in East Asia 15, 17 (Hideki Kanda, Kon-Sik Kim, & Curtis J. 
Milhaupt eds., 2008). 
 89. See Hiroshi Oda, Shareholder’s Derivative Action in Japan, 8 EUR. COMP. & FIN. L. REV. 334, 338 (2011) 
(detailing plaintiff’s argument that the contested value was incalculable). 
  90.  SHŌHŌ [COMM. C.], 1899, art. 267, para. 4 (Japan). 
 91. See Minji soshō hiyō tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Costs of Civil Procedure], Law No. 40 of 1971, art. 4, 
para. 2 (Japan) (noting the litigation target cannot exceed 1.6 million Yen in an action where the claim is not a 
property right). 
 92. Fujita, supra note 89. 
 93. Id. at 16 (citing Sumio Hirose & Noriyuki, Yanagawa, Daihyo-sosho-seido Kaisei no Kigyo-kachi heno 
Eikyo (デリバティブ行為に対する改革の企業価値への影響) [The Impact of Reform on Derivative Action to 
the Firm Value]) (2002) (unpublished)). 
 94.  Fangpeng (Frank) Meng, Funding Derivative Actions in China: Lessons from Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2) 
for the Court, 31(1), COMPANY LAW. 29, 29 (2010). 
 95. See Andrew Keay & Jingchen Zhao, Ascertaining the Notion of Board Accountability in Chinese Listed 
Companies, 46 H.K.L.J. 671, 699-700 (2016) (explaining that an accountability system can be transplanted to 
China through importing legal rules subject to changes and local conditions). 
 96. See Jean Tirole & Bengt Holmstrom, Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring, 101 J. POL. ECON. 
678, 680 (1993) (“However, market monitoring is not costless. Somebody has to pay the speculator for his 
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costs.97  Within these proposals, the focus has been on transplanting the fixed fee. However, 
there has been a lack of discussion of the rationale for these proposals, which should be 
closely linked to the nature of claims and the remedy of derivative action.  
In addition to encouraging more litigation in the form of derivative action, it is key to 
clarify the nature of the mechanism and the relationship between its nature and the litigation 
fee. The nature of derivative action mechanisms is related to the filing fee in two interlocking 
ways. First, shareholders are seeking remedies and recoveries through legal action taken on 
behalf of their companies, which will benefit directly from successful litigation. The company 
is the “functional plaintiff” as “the real party in interest.”98 The value of the derivative action 
mechanism is twofold, including the ex ante value—namely the deterrence effect that 
prevents directors’ misconduct, and the ex post value—offering redress for the company 
directly and the shareholders indirectly. Both values are closely related to the interests of the 
company. In the derivative action regime, companies are the aggrieved party, and the 
claimants enforce the right of the companies to take legal action. 99  Therefore the 
compensation claim is an indirect one. Second, the relief from successful litigation rests upon 
various factors—including some that are long-term or short-term, tangible or intangible, and 
directly or indirectly linked to the suspension or deterrence of directors’ misconduct. Like 
derivative action in any jurisdiction, it is virtually impossible to assess the benefits of the 
deterrence of corporate wrongdoing or the net recovery from the litigation.  
A shareholder under the scheme will institute an action on behalf of the company for 
the harm suffered by the company, in circumstances where the boards of directors are 
reluctant or incompetent to enforce their rights.100 The benefit that the shareholders could 
obtain from increased share prices and higher dividends as the result of any deterrence of 
misconduct cannot be calculated. The shareholders will thereby ensure the management of 
company affairs in a manner whereby they stand to acquire maximum returns on their 
investments through dividends, if declared.101 A derivative action is intended to rectify a 
wrong,102 but the result of this wrongdoing may be impossible to calculate. It may be a long-
term outcome affected by a range of factors that have an impact on share price and company 
performance, including strategic management policies, corporate governance, a better 
business environment or government policies, etc. The shareholder, as the direct claimant, 
shares the success of the litigation partially and proportionately with other shareholders.  In 
 
monitoring service.”). 
 97. Zhong Zhang, Making Shareholder Derivative Action Happen in China: How Should Lawsuits be Funded, 
38 H. K. L. J. 523, 561 (2010); Jingchen Zhao, A More Efficient Derivative Action System in China: Challenges 
and Opportunities through Corporate Governance Theory, 64 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 233, 243 (2013); Jingchen Zhao & 
Shuangge Wen, The Eligibility of Claimants to Commerce Derivative Litigation on Behalf of China’s Joint Stock 
Limited Companies, 48 H. K. L. J. 687, 726 (2018); Dan Wang (王丹), Paisheng susong zijin jili wenti yanjiu (派
生诉讼资金激励问题研究)[The Analysis of Establishing Adequate Funding Incentive of Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation], BIJIAO FALÜ YANJIU (比较法律研究)[ RESEARCH ON COMP. L.] 165, 169-170 (2015). 
 98. Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1749, 1756 (2010). 
 99. Farnham v. Fingold, [1972] 3 O.R. 688 (Can.). 
 99.  Id. 
 101.  Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops 
the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1345 n.34 (1993). 
 102.  See Thomas P. Kinney, Stockholder Derivative Suits: Demand and Futility Where the Board Fails to Stop 
Wrongdoers, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 172, 172 (1994) (explaining that derivative lawsuits allow shareholders to bring 
lawsuits against wrongdoers on behalf of a corporation). 
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cases where the board has exercised its discretion, rewards are distributed through the 
payment of dividends or more sustainable stakeholder relationships and beneficial contractual 
terms to benefit stakeholders such as employees and suppliers.103 
All in all, learning from Japanese historical, empirical, and legislative experiences, it is 
clear that filing fees can have an immense impact on the frequency of derivative actions. If 
derivative action is to be an effective tool to promote corporate governance and protect 
shareholders by improving the soundness and effectiveness of boards’ decisions, the barrier 
of the filing fee needs to be removed. This is particularly relevant and urgent for the case of 
JSLCs, where professional directors are appointed to ensure a separation of ownership and 
control,.104 The derivative action mechanism not only has a supervision function towards 
boards’ behavior, but also has a deterrence function in terms of the misconduct of boards and 
majority shareholders. Unreasonable fees based on a sliding scale should be replaced by fixed 
and affordable fees. As the most significant barriers for JSLCs to pursue derivative actions, 
issues around the filing fee merit an examination of the substance of the problem.105 However, 
due to the dispersed shareholding ownership of JSLCs in China, a reasonable fixed filing fee 
in combination with an appropriately revised shareholding percentage and period 
requirements for shareholder eligibility to bring derivative actions, may be a way forward in 
order to achieve a good balance between giving adequate incentives to shareholders to use 
derivative action and the avoidance of issues such as frivolous lawsuits (“strike suits”), 
unnecessary distraction for directors, supervisors and senior managers, and excessive 
workloads for the courts. 
III. THE CURRENT LAW CONCERNING ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR DERIVATIVE 
ACTION IN CHINA: CHALLENGES AND THE US EXPERIENCE 
Another key litigation cost that has a direct impact on the incentives of attorneys and 
claimant shareholders to bring derivative lawsuits is lawyers’ fees. There is no legislation in 
China directly regulating lawyers’ fees because the relationship between the lawyer and 
claimant shareholders is seen as a private business relationship. The “American rule” has 
been adopted in China to address the issues of lawyers’ fees: the claimant and defendant will 
pay their own attorneys’ fee irrespective of the outcome of the lawsuit. 106  A plaintiff 
shareholder will need to reach an agreement with the lawyer who will charge the shareholder 
contingent on the result of the derivative action litigation. This is also similar to the 
 
 103.   See George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion Problem, 100 VA. L. REV. 261, 
291 (2014) (arguing that a derivative claim is “doomed” in a legal system that forces an individual shareholder to 
shoulder all of the legal fees related to filing). 
 104.  See Huang, supra note 7, at 645 (noting that one reason for the high volume of derivative suits is low 
procedural barriers). 
 105.  Id. at 648 (stating that other barriers include the prescribed shareholding threshold—constituting a 
requirement to hold 1% or more of the company’s shares for 180 consecutive days—and the difficulties in pre-
payment with the possibility of getting indemnified). 
 106.  Cf. JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN-INVESTED 
ENTERPRISES 55-79 (3rd ed. 2010) (discussing the development of lawmaking in China). 
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contingency fee arrangement in US law.107 Therefore, we will look to US law to explore 
possible improvements regarding lawyers’ fees.   
In terms of the value of the attorneys’ fee, two options are available according to the 
Measures for the Administration of Attorneys’ Fees 2006: the fees may be fixed at a 
percentage no higher than 30% of the amount of the damages claimed as the result of a 
successful litigation;108 or a “reasonable fee arrangement” may be adopted, whereby fees are 
charged on the basis of the subject-matter of the case or of the time taken.109 In the approach 
based on a fixed percentage of the amount of damages claimed, a claimant shareholder could 
conclude an agreement and the attorney’s fee would be charged contingent on the amount of 
the claimed damages in a successfully litigated or settled case, which is similar to the 
approach adopted in the US (a contingency fee arrangement).110 However, a deeper and closer 
look at the approach generates some concerns about making this relatively successful method 
equally efficacious in China.  
A.  Contingency Fee Agreement  
A “contingency fee arrangement” has been adopted and was regarded as an approach 
that provides a “significantly lower disincentive to prospective claimants,” compared with 
the approaches adopted in other jurisdictions such as the UK. 111 However, a question arises 
as to whether this positive effect will also be applicable in China, where the claimant 
shareholder could reach an agreement with the attorney by agreeing the attorney’s fee if the 
damage claims are monetary. This fee may only be payable contingent on the result of the 
derivative action, thereby providing incentives for shareholders to employ the arguably 
under-used derivative action mechanism.112 
The pervasiveness of “contingency fee agreements” in the US largely solved the 
problem of a lack of compensatory incentives for shareholders.113 According to this rule, 
claimant shareholders are not supposed to pay attorneys’ fees unless and until the attorney 
recovers compensation for the shareholders by acquiring a settlement or by attaining a 
favorable trial judgement. In other words, the shareholders and attorney agree that the latter 
will shoulder the financial cost of pursuing the litigation and will be compensated according 
to a fixed percentage for a successful litigation or settlement.  
 
 107.  WENJING CHEN, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FUNDING SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 199 (2017) (ebook). 
 108.  Lvshi fuwu shouli fei guanli banfa 2006 (律师服务受理费管理办法 2006) [Measures on Services Fee of 
Lawyers 2006], art. 13. 
 109.  Meng, supra note 94. 
 110.  See ZHONG ZHANG, DERIVATIVE ACTION AND GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA: ECONOMIC 
THEORIES AND LEGAL RULES 212 (2011) (stating that with this practice “there is a possibility that a plaintiff can be 
protected from the risk of paying his lawyers.”). 
 111.  REISBERG, supra note 9, at 226. 
 112.  See Yunyang Zhu (朱芸阳), Lun gudong paisheng susong de shixian (论股东派生诉讼的实现) [The 
Realisation of Derivative Action], QINGHUA FAXUE (清华法学) [TSINGHUA L. J.] Vol. 6, 107, 118 (2012); JUNHAI 
LIU (刘俊海), XIANDAI GONGSI FA (现代公司法) [MODERN CORPORATION LAW] 412 (3rd ed., 2015); WENJING 
CHEN, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FUNDING SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 18-31 (2017). 
 113.  See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory and Evidence 
from East Asia, 29 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 169, 184—85 (2004) (explaining that the availability of fee arrangements 
for plaintiff’s attorney in the U.S. stands in sharp contrast to the corporate law enforcement in East Asia). 
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However, the contingency fee arrangement has already shown potential deficiencies in 
China as a fair approach for shareholders, insofar as it lacks potential to give shareholders 
sufficient incentives to bring a derivative action. If the litigation is successful, benefits will 
be awarded directly to the company and indirectly to the shareholders. The claimant 
shareholder would have to fund the initial attorneys’ fee because the service contract is 
between the shareholder and the attorney. Consequently, claimant shareholders will receive 
only a small pro rata benefit, and the rest of the shareholders will enjoy a free ride on the 
backs of claimant shareholders.  
Under this contingency fee approach, the shareholder would personally have to pay a 
certain percentage of the damages recovered up-front, if the litigation was successful in the 
case of monetary claims. Fees go to attorneys only if the derivative action generates money 
damages and tangible relief, which is not always possible in derivative actions. Some of the 
damages related to directors’ misconduct may be measurable, while some may be hard to 
assess in terms long-term impact on the company (e.g. reputational damage). Positively, it is 
stipulated by Provision IV that courts in China should support the indemnity claims of 
shareholders who bring lawsuits on behalf of the company for reasonable expenses paid by 
the shareholder for participating in the action.114 However, this is only applicable to cases 
where the claims are fully or partially supported by the court.115 In addition to limitations on 
the scope of the provision, “reasonable” expenses is a vague term, with its interpretation 
relying on what are perceived by the parties to be standard terms.116 These terms may be not 
uniformly defined in the case of derivative actions in practice. It is not completely clear that 
attorneys’ fee will be fully recoverable as part of “reasonable” expenses.117 Ironically, if the 
litigation is not successful the shareholder might be in a better position in terms of the 
litigation costs, being free from responsibility for attorneys’ fees based on the contingency 
fee arrangement.  
Before 2006, the “no win, no fee” agreement was very common in China for  derivative 
action cases, despite the fact that the mechanism itself had not been adopted in national 
legislation.118 However, under the current regulation in China the contingency fee approach 
has been prohibited in specified classes of cases, such as criminal, administrative, state 
compensation and multi-claimant lawsuits.119 In relation to litigation in derivative actions, the 
rule applies to multi-claimant lawsuits when more than one shareholder bring the litigation 
together. Despite the fact that this limits the scope of the contingency fee arrangement, this 
could be problematic in terms of derivative actions, particularly in JSLCs, due to difficulties 
 
 114.   Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shiyong  <zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongsi fa > ruogan wenti de 
guiding (si) (最高人民法院关于适用＜中华人民共和国公司法＞若干问题的规定(四)) [Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues about the Application of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (IV)], art. 26. 
115.  Id. 
 116.   See Flora Xiao Huang, Shareholder Revolt?: The Statutory Derivative Action in China, 5 COMP. RES. IN 
L. & POL. ECON. 1, 7, 16 (2009) (discussing how courts in China provide alternative ways for the reimbursement of 
expense, including “reasonable litigation fees” such as attorneys’ fee). 
 117.   Id. at 16. 
 118.   Zhong Zhang, Making Shareholder Derivative Actions Happen in China: How Should Lawsuits Be 
Funded, 38 H.K.L.J. 523, 545 (2008). 
 119.   Lvshi fuwu shouli fei guanli banfa (律师服务受理费管理办法 2006) [Measures on Services Fee of 
Lawyers 2006], art. 12. 
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in reaching the holding threshold of 1% of the company’s shares for 180 consecutive days.120 
There may be a need for collective litigation in order to satisfy the 1% requirement.121   
Furthermore, the approach adopted in China, which is similar to the contingency fee 
arrangement, may not work in the same way as in the US for a number of reasons. Primarily, 
in China the contingency fee arrangement is not supported by a “common fund,” which would 
allow the payment of attorneys’ fees out of the fund for successful actions. A claimant 
shareholder needs to pay the attorneys’ fee for a successful lawsuit, despite the fact that the 
relief and rewards from successful derivative lawsuits go to the company. It is rather irrational 
and discouraging that claimant shareholders do not pay attorneys’ fees for unsuccessful 
claims based on the contingency fee agreement, whereas they have to pay if the lawsuits are 
successful. As the claimant’s costs increase, shareholders may seek remedies other than 
bringing an action on behalf of the company in a derivative manner. All in all, it is worth 
revisiting the case of multi-claimant (collective) litigation, including clarification regarding 
whether constraints apply to collective derivative action litigation where more than one 
shareholder brings the lawsuit in order to satisfy the 1% shareholding ownership requirement. 
Additionally, it may be necessary to explore the possibility of introducing a common fund 
arrangement and the notion of “entrepreneurial attorneys” in China to support the 
effectiveness of the contingency fee model, although this may be quite difficult and take a 
long time.  
B. Common Fund Arrangement 
The “common fund” is set up in a scenario where an attorney in a derivative action helps 
to set up, accumulate or maintain a fund from which the attorneys themselves may receive 
fees and claim expenses directly.122 This approach is designed to encourage more attorneys 
to take on derivative action cases. 123  All monetary awards to companies or settlements 
resulting from derivative actions have to be paid into the common fund, and the contingency 
fee of the attorney, based on the agreement between the claimant shareholders and the 
attorney, is treated as a charge on the common fund.124 The attorneys will get a certain 
percentage of the common fund as their fee. 125  The common fund principle and 
supplementary mechanisms as adopted in the US shift the financial risk of pursuing a 
derivative action from the claimant shareholders to the attorneys.126 Therefore, shareholders 
 
 120.   Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongsi fa (中华人民共和国公司法) [Chinese Company Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Dec. 28, 1993, effective Mar. 1, 2014), art. 151. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (reiterating that “a litigant or a lawyer who 
recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable 
attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.”). 
 123.  HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 178 (2004). 
 124.  See Carol G. Hammett, Attorneys’ Fees in Shareholder Derivative Suits: The Substantial Benefit Rule 
Reexamined, 60 CAL. L. REV. 164, 168 (1972) (explaining the theories of why attorneys’ fees may be recovered 
from a fund in derivative suits). 
 125.See Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative 
Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017-1044 (2005); Jamie 
D. Kurtz, An Exception to the Derivative Rule: Allowing Mutual Fund Investors to Bring Suits Directly, 82 
BROOK. L. REV. 1425 (2017). 
 126.  Harald Baum & Dan. W. Puchniak, The Derivative Action: An Economic, Historical and Practice-
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may be willing to proceed with the lawsuit even if they are not confident about the litigation, 
since there is no downside risk.127 
Additionally, the common fund principle for US attorneys, as controllers of the conduct 
of litigation on behalf of the claimant shareholders, is closely related to the nature of litigation 
as an entrepreneurial activity with the purpose of maximizing profit. Attorneys are commonly 
regarded as “entrepreneurs,” who, in the case of derivative actions, may conduct litigation 
nearly independently without being monitored by shareholders.128  Shareholders are merely 
used as the key to the courtroom door. This type of entrepreneurial litigation is regarded as a 
process by which adversaries reach an agreement on the litigation odds and subsequently 
settle the case out of court, so as to avoid additional transaction costs.129 Different from the 
two-way fee shifting in English law, the attorney in the US model is seen as being in a joint 
venture with the litigant shareholders.130 Attorneys and their clients appear to be in the same 
boat, sharing the gains and the fruits of victory in the litigation. However, without 
involvement, supervision and monitoring by their clients, the attorneys, who are typically 
senior partners in the US,131 may act largely according to their own interests, subject to the 
regulations imposed by “bar disciplines, judicial oversight and their own sense of ethics and 
fiduciary responsibilities.”132  
Applying the same notion in China, Huang argues that “there is no shortage of 
entrepreneurial lawyers in China, and they race to represent as many investor plaintiffs as 
possible in the area of securities cases.”133 He observed through empirical research that 
“China’s securities civil cases are lawyer-driven.”134 Coffee asserts that “the size and scale of 
the Chinese securities market could potentially encourage and support a sizable indigenous 
population of entrepreneurial litigators.”135 These arguments imply that the environment for 
establishing a common fund arrangement does exist in China, entrepreneurial lawyers are not 
uncommon, and the situation may apply to derivative action cases. However, the legislative 
frameworks in areas such as bar discipline and legal ethics are under development in China, 
and the enforcement of legislative frameworks in these areas is worrying and far from 
perfect.136 
 
Oriented Approach, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 21 (Dan 
W. Puchniak et al. ed. 2012). 
 127.   Id. 
 128.   John C. Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the 
Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 893 (1987). 
 129.   John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 288-91, 296 (1973). 
 130.   Coffee, supra note 129, at 896. 
 131.   DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? 23 (Russell Sage Foundation, 
1974). 
 132.   Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative 
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 8 (1991). 
 133.   Hui Huang, Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A Ten-Year Retrospective and Empirical 
Assessment, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 757, 768 (2013). 
 134.   Id. at 798. 
 135.   John C. Coffee, The Globalization of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Law, Culture, and Incentives, 165 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1895, 1925 (2017). 
 136.   See generally Eli Wald, Notes from Tsinghua: Law and Legal Ethics in Contemporary China, 23 CONN. 
J. INT’L L. 369 (2008); Christopher Arup, Lawyers for China: The Impact of Membership of the World Trade 
Organization on Legal Services and Law in China, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 741 (2001); Sida Liu, Lawyers, 
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A few additional concerns may require policy makers and the government to think 
carefully before introducing such an approach in China, since it may entail some potential 
challenges. First, the current emphasis on economic development in China and the 
companies’ priorities in putting profit maximization at the top of their agenda137 make it very 
hard for companies to set aside money at the request of minority shareholders, in order to 
establish a common fund for litigations against their board members or controlling 
shareholders. Traditionally, many listed companies within the scope of JSLCs in China still 
constitute “state-owned enterprises” (SOEs), and the largest shareholder is normally the 
state.138 It may be even harder for SOEs to establish a common fund for derivative actions 
where the claimants in these cases are civil servants (as directors) and the state is the majority 
shareholder or the biggest shareholder. It is hard for the board of directors to authorize such 
a common fund, considering the close guanxi between executive board members, supervisors, 
and controlling shareholders. Moreover, it is problematic to envisage that Chinese lawyers 
would be willing to take on the big risks of pursuing derivative actions if the initiation of the 
case comes from minority shareholders, who may have a limited voice and information that 
could be made available for attorneys to promote the success of the cases. The attorneys may 
also be aware of difficulties in convincing the supervisor or supervisory board to pursue a 
derivative action, particularly if they are aware of potential difficulties in concluding a 
successful derivative lawsuit considering the guanxi between the two boards, independent 
directors, and the controlling power of majority shareholders and the directors.  
As a strong theoretical basis for the common fund principle, classic Anglo-American 
derivative actions are, de facto, double suits at equity.  One of the suits is a claim by the 
company as the “real party plaintiff” against alleged wrongdoers, while the other is the claim 
by the shareholder. 139  Conventionally in Chinese civil procedure law, a company in a 
derivative lawsuit may be regarded as either a second claimant after the shareholders who 
initiate the derivative action or a third party allowed under the Civil Procedure rules on a 
voluntary basis if the company considers that it has the independent right to claim the subject 
matter of the action or join the litigation without independent rights. 140  This is further 
interpreted after the enactment of the Provision IV. The statutes of companies and 
shareholders in derivative actions have been explicitly confirmed as follows: where the board 
of supervisors or a supervisor of a LLC without a board of supervisors initiates an action 
against a director or a senior executive under Article 151(1) of the Company Law, the 
company shall be treated as the plaintiff; where the board of directors or the executive director 
of a LLC without a board of directors initiates an action against a supervisor of the company 
 
State Officials and Significant Others: Symbiotic Exchange in the Chinese Legal Services Market, CHINA Q. 276 
(2011). 
 137.   Dana M. Muir et al., The Future of Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Companies: China and 
Comity Concerns, 46 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 1315, 1343 (2013). 
 138.   See Yordying Thanatawee, Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy: Evidence from China, 6 INT’L J. 
ECON. & FIN. 197, 199 (2014) (describing that it is reported that an average of 31.27% of the shares in these 
companies are held by the government). 
 139.   Donald Clarke & Nicholas Calcina Howson, Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative 
Action in The People’s Republic of China, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 243, 291 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 1st ed. 2012); Maximilian Koessler, The 
Stockholder’s Suit: A Comparative View, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 238, 242 (1946); see Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 
460 P.2d 464, 470 (Cal. 1969) (describing the purpose of a stockholder derivative suit). 
 140.   See Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 56 2013 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
minshi susong fa 中华人民共和国民事诉讼法. 
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under Article 151(1) of the Company Law or against any other person under Article 151(3) 
of the Company Law, the company shall be treated as the plaintiff; where a shareholder meets 
the conditions set out in Article 151(1) of the Company Law and directly initiates an action 
against a director, supervisor, senior executive, or any other person under Article 151(2)-(3) 
of the Company Law, the company shall be named as a third person.141 Moreover, where a 
shareholder directly initiates an action under Article 151(2)-(3) of the Company Law, the 
company shall be the party to benefit from successful litigation.  
Therefore, it may be helpful to introduce the notion of “real party plaintiff” where a 
shareholder directly initiates a derivative action. This may be archived through the 
interpretation of the Provisions offered by the Supreme Court. Recognition and a clear 
classification of the role played the company will be important before the common fund 
principle may be established in China. If the company is defined as the “plaintiff” or “real 
party plaintiff” in derivative action, it makes cost allocation appropriate and rational, which 
makes the potential transplant of the “common fund principle” possible and legitimate. 
C.  The American Rule and Substantial Benefit Test 
In addition to and in conjunction with the contingent rule and the common fund 
approach, a few more rules and tests are applied in US courts in order to give attorneys enough 
incentives to take on derivative actions. These include the “American rule” and the 
“substantial benefit test”. The “American rule” provides that each party in the litigation is 
responsible for paying his or her own attorney’s fee, irrespective of the result of the 
litigation.142 Functioning on the basis of the principle of “no win, no fee,”143 the “American 
rule” makes the claimant in derivative actions less concerned about attorneys’ fees, since 
attorneys will be paid by the company out of the funds recovered from the action for 
successful cases, whereas they won’t be eligible for any payment if the cases are lost. 
However, these benefits only apply to cases when there is a tangible benefit to the company.  
As for intangible or therapeutic relief, the “substantial benefit test” makes economic 
incentives for claimant attorneys possible and enforceable144 by allowing them to receive a 
contingency fee through the “lodestar method”.145 Based on this method, attorneys are paid 
for their work by multiplying the number of hours they reasonably spend on the case to secure 
a successful result for the client by a reasonable hourly rate.146 If a successful derivative action 
 
 141.   Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shiyong  <zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongsi fa > ruogan wenti de 
guiding (si) (最高人民法院关于适用＜中华人民共和国公司法＞若干问题的规定(四)) [Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues about the Application of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (IV)], art. 24. 
 142.   See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); but see Court 
Awarded Atty. Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 241 (1985) (criticizing the Alyeska Pipeline rule). 
 143.   See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2018). 
 144.   JAMES COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 466 (Aspen, 2nd ed. 2003). 
 145.   See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 395-397 (1970) (explaining the relationship between 
derivative suits and attorney fees). 
 146.   See generally Friedrich v. Fidelity Nat. Bank, 545 S.E.2d 107 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Lindy Bros. Builders 
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1973); Mahler v. Szucs, 957 P.2d 632, 
650–51 (Wash. 1998); Travis v. Wash. Horse Breeders Ass’n, 759 P.2d 418, 425–26 (Wash. 1988); see also 
Robert T.  Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J. CORP. L. 267, 334-48 
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brings about a substantial benefit for the company, the lodestar will be adjusted by a multiplier 
to reflect a number of additional factors including, most significantly, the risk of the litigation. 
The parties in the case and the courts are required to utilize a demonstrable method for the 
fee calculation.147 
The “substantial benefit” doctrine is regarded as an exception to the contingency fee 
rule,148 since the payment of contingency fees is limited to tangible relief. It is necessary and 
functional to have this exception for fee-oriented issues due to the unique nature of the 
derivative action mechanism. This was further affirmed by the practical implications of the 
rule as demonstrated by an empirical study, which concluded that derivative actions in the 
US always result in non-monetary relief.149 
It can be observed that the contingency fee system, enriched by common funds and the 
substantial benefit doctrine, gives attorneys and shareholders adequate incentives to use the 
derivative action approach. However, the “lodestar method,” which is used in the majority of 
states in the US for awarding fees out of the fund, has various problems and drawbacks such 
as very heavy calculation costs; the factors that have been relied on for calculating a 
reasonable fee are “amorphous [and] ill-defined.”150 This may also give attorneys incentives 
to exaggerate their hours or delay the litigation needlessly in order to gain a higher fee.151 It 
also fails to give claimants’ attorneys a proper incentive to reach a settlement agreement. A 
settlement may maximize recovery for the claimant, since such agreements assure attorney’s 
fees if successful.152 The hourly rate that is potentially recoverable must be the rate actually 
charged by professionals according to an objective comparison—it must be reasonable for 
professionals with similar skills and experience. This comparison could nevertheless be 
unpredictable, unclear, and uncertain. 
These problems could be equally, if not more, significant in China, considering 
problems such as a lack of a fully comprehensive legal system regulating attorneys’ behavior, 
and the information asymmetry that affects minority shareholders. Information is an 
important precondition for deciding on a reasonable number of hours, a reasonable rate, and 
ensuring the accurate application of the objective test. Minority shareholders may not have 
effective access to the information they need; they are likely to be limited to the information 
already available to the public. This may lead to blind trust in the attorney’s advice and 
proposed solutions. Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that Chinese communities are 
 
(1978). 
 147.   See generally Mahler, 957 P.2d at 650–51. 
 148.   See Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 768 (9th Cir. 1977) (describing the substantial 
benefit doctrine as a significant variance to the common fund doctrine); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 
264-67 n.39 (describing Justice Marshall’s preferred approach as an expanded version of the common fund 
approach to the awarding of attorneys’ fees); see also Arad Reisberg, Funding Derivative Actions: A Re-
Examination of Costs and Fees as Incentives to Commence Litigation, 4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 345 (2004). 
 149.   See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 
62 (1991) (stating the data “make[s] clear that derivative suits have a minor compensatory function”). 
 150.  See Philip A. Talmadge & Thomas M. Fitzpatrick, The Lodestar Method for Calculating Reasonable 
Attorney Fee in Washington, 52 GONZAGA L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (commenting on Washington’s rules for attorney 
fees); see also WASH. CT. RPC § 1.5 (1990) (outlining the state of Washington’s rules for attorney fees);. 
 151.   Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative 
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 22 (1991). 
 152.   Id. at 4; see also Talmadge & Fitzpatrick, supra note 150, at 1 (arguing that when a party secures a 
favorable result by settlement, the party should also be entitled to an award of attorney fees if otherwise permitted 
by statute, contract, or equity to receive fees). 
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suffering from low trust; China has been in a credibility-and-trust crisis since the 1960s, 
mainly as a result of the Cultural Revolution.153 This has been extended to companies with 
the global impact of corporate scandals such as the San Lu baby milk powder scandal in 2008, 
the Hogwash cooking oil scandal in 2010, and the RYB kindergarten abuse scandal in 
November 2017.154 Furthermore, the lack of an effective and rigorous public complaints 
mechanism, a unified industry assessment supervision mechanism, and commonly 
recognized average market prices are further reasons making the effective enforcement of the 
lodestar method doubtful and difficult.  
 D.  The Approach in the UK: Popularity and Enforceability 
The approach in the UK has been followed by most Commonwealth jurisdictions as the 
traditional approach in order to address the obstacle of funding in a derivative action.155  The 
logic and reason for the “indemnity order” approach rests on the principle of equity.156  This 
approach gives a shareholder who brings a derivative action rights to be indemnified from the 
company against costs. It is designed to reflect the true nature of derivative actions as a 
mechanism enabling shareholders to enforce the company’s rights for the company’s benefit. 
The rationale is that the rights being vindicated are those of the company and recovery flows 
to it, and therefore the company should be responsible for repayment of the costs.157 The 
approach has been suggested by some scholars as a way forward for China.158 This Section 
serves two functions. First, it tests the fitness of the UK model for China in detail, rather than 
relying on principle-based discussions alone. Second, it clarifies the rationale of the UK 
derivative action fee model, particularly in relation to the nature of the mechanism in order 
to justify the stipulation in Provision IV on fee-related issues in relation to derivative actions.  
The “indemnity order” was enforced in the UK in order to address issues of 
disincentives for claimants in taking derivative actions.159 The rule was first made legitimate 
in Wallersteiner v. Moir (No 2), where Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal asserted that a 
company should indemnify a shareholder defendant in a derivative suit since the shareholder 
was acting on behalf of the company, which is the direct beneficiary.160 In the case, the 
 
 153.   See, e.g., Lingwei Wu, The Invisible Wound: The Long Term Impact of China’s Cultural Revolution on 
Trust, H.K. U. SCI. & TECH. 1, 25 (2015) (finding that individuals from counties with higher Cultural Revolution 
intensity and exposed to more years of interrupted schooling trust significantly less). 
 154.   See Weiying Zhang & Rongzhu. Ke, Xinren Jiqi Jieshi: Laizi Zhongguo de Kuasheng Diaocha Fenxi (信
任及其解释: 来自中国的跨省调查分析) [Trust in China: A Cross-Regional Analysis] 10  JINGJI YANJIU  (经济
研究) [ECON. RESEARCH J. ] 59 (2002); Qing Yang & Wenfeng Tang, Exploring the Sources of Institutional Trust 
in China: Culture, Mobilization, or Performance? 2 ASIAN POL. & POL’Y 415 (2010). 
 155.   See generally Foyster v. Foyster Holdings Pty. Ltd. [2003] NSWSC 135 (Austl.); see also Companies 
Act 1993, s 166 (following the UK’s approach in New Zealand); Australian Corporations Act 2001, s 236 
(following the UK’s approach in Australia). 
 156.  Wallersteiner v. Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 All ER 849 at 858 (Eng.). 
 157.  John D. Wilson, Attorney Fees and the Decision to Commence Litigation: Analysis, Comparison and an 
Application to the Shareholders’ Derivative Action, 5 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 142, 177 (1985). 
 158.  Meng, supra note 94, at 29. 
 159.  Zhong Zhang, Making Shareholder Derivative Action Happen in China: How Should Lawsuits be 
Funded, 38 H.K. L. J. 523, 530 (2010). 
 160.  Wallersteiner v. Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 All ER 849 at 858 (Eng.). 
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difficulties of Mr. Moir were met with sympathy from the Court of Appeal, particularly from 
Lord Denning.161 According to the judgement, shareholders who bring a claim should be 
treated as trustees or agents who act on behalf of the beneficiary or the principal.162 Lord 
Denning suggested a more reasonable procedural rule;163 the test in deciding whether to make 
such an order was held to be whether the shareholders are acting in good faith, and it would 
have been reasonable for an independent board of directors to bring such actions in the 
company’s name.164 The result of a derivative action is irrelevant to the order of indemnity. 
That means that even if an action fails the claimant is also entitled to be indemnified, since 
the lawsuit is de facto an action of the company and hence the risk of losing the case should 
be borne by the company. It is non-arguable that if the derivative action is successful the 
recoveries accrue to the company as a whole, with the shareholder who brought the claim 
receiving only a small percentage of the benefit. The fact that other shareholders may have a 
“free ride” and directly benefit from derivative claims brought by the defendant shareholder, 
who did all the hard work, will make defendant shareholders less willing and give them less 
incentive to bring such actions in the future.   
The principle has been followed in both case law and statues in the UK. Lord Justice 
Hoffmann in McDonald v. Horn (with whom Lord Justices Hirst and Balcombe agreed) 
referred to the principles which apply when trustees and other fiduciaries apply for an 
indemnity out of the relevant fund; 165 Justice Roth claimed in Stainer v. Lee that a shareholder 
who has passed the stages for derivative action “should normally be indemnified as to his 
reasonable costs by the company[.]”166 Lord Justice Arden asserted in Carlisle & Cumbria 
United Independent Supporters’ Society Ltd v. CUFC Holdings Ltd that in a “derivative 
action on behalf of the Club, the trust had an expectation of receiving its proper costs from 
the Companies on an indemnity basis[.]”167 However, the court needs to exercise considerable 
care in deciding whether to give a preemptive indemnity order.168 The circumstances under 
which an order is to be made are rather obscure,169 with many uncertainties dependent on 
judicial discretion.170 This considerable discretion may create uncertainties and cause great 
distress for shareholders and result in no positive impact in terms of encouraging derivative 
actions.  
 
 161.  See id. at 856 (stating that Mr. Moir had exhausted all of his financial resources during the 10-year 
litigation). 
 162.   Id. at 858–59. 
 163.  See id. at 859 (considering Mr. Moir’s plight, stating, “[t]he minority shareholder should apply ex parte to 
the master for directions, supported by an opinion of counsel, as to whether there is a reasonable case or not. The 
master may then, if he thinks fit, straightaway approve the continuance of the proceeding until the close of 
pleadings, or until after discovery or until trial . . . The master need not, however, decide it ex parte . . . The master 
should simply ask himself: is there a reasonable case for the minority shareholder to bring at the expense 
(eventually) of the company? If there is, let it go ahead.”). 
 164.  Id. at 868. 
 165.  [1995] ICR 685. 
 166.  Stainer v. Lee [2010] EWHC (Ch) 1539 [56] (Eng.). 
 167.  Carlisle & Cumbria United Indep. Supporters’ Soc’y Ltd. v. C.U.F.C Holdings Ltd [2010] EWCA (Civ) 
463 [8] (Eng.). 
 168.  Bhullar v. Bhullar [2003] EWCA (Civ) 424 [11]-[13] (Eng.). 
 169.  Carsten A. Paul, Derivative Actions under English and German Corporate Law – Shareholder 
Participation between the Tension Filled Areas of Corporate Governance and Malicious Shareholder Interference, 
7 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 81, 96 (2010); see also Smith v. Croft (No.1) [1986] 2 All ER 580 (Eng.). 
 170.  Anil Hargovan, Under Judicial and Legislative Attack: The Rule in Foss v. Harbottle, 113 S. AFR. L. J. 
631, 648 (1996). 
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Furthermore, understanding the nature of and attitude towards indemnity orders in cases 
has not reached a consensus. It would be hard for China to learn from an uncertain principle 
with ambiguity in common law, despite the fact that China’s own guiding cases system has 
attracted much attention and optimism.171 For example, it was established in Wallersteiner 
that an indemnity order by the court should be one that is “simple and inexpensive” without 
being allowed to “escalate into a minor trial”.172 However, Walton J took a restrictive view 
of the jurisdiction to make an indemnity order, and found that the order would be “palpably 
unjust.”173 There are also concerns about the possibility of generating strike suits; the very 
possibility of obtaining an order could conceivably encourage vexatious claims.174  
Furthermore, a “financial need test” was proposed for the application of an indemnity 
order in Smith v Croft,175 where Walton J dealt with funding issues in a cautious manner due 
to the fact that making an indemnity order “may turn out to have imposed on the company a 
liability which ought never to have been imposed upon it.”176 It was held that an indemnity 
order would have been oppressive and unfair and should not be made ex parte.177 Following 
this logic, shareholders should only pursue funding through “an order for interim payment” 
if they do not have sufficient resources to fund the action or can demonstrate that they 
genuinely require funding support.178 It is held that the precise amount of the order will 
depend upon the “pecuniary situation” and “the individual circumstances of each case.”179 
Additionally, the test of whether an independent board of directors would consider taking 
action in the same circumstances to clarify the availability of an indemnity order was 
introduced by Walton, which may further complicate the application of the Wallersteiner 
principle.180 Finally, the independence judgment and board independence in themselves are 
vague definitions.181 The dual-proceedings rule applies to the indemnity order, and the test 
relying on judgment of an independent board of directors further muddies the waters.  
The approach derived from the Wallersteiner Principle has been criticized for 
contradicting the nature of derivative action, where shareholders are the “representatives” and 
the financial situations of shareholders should not be relevant to decisions of the court in 
granting an indemnity order.182 The approach also increases the discretion of the court, not 
only in terms of whether to grant the order but also regarding how much should be granted if 
the application were to be successful. These discretions make it harder for civil law countries 
with limited judicial resources and troubling judicial ability to use discretion in reaching 
legitimate and justifiable decisions on a case-by-case basis.  
 
 171. Mark Jia, Chinese Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2213, 2234 
(2016). 
 172.  Wallersteiner v. Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 All ER 849 at 859 (Eng.) 
 173.  Smith v. Croft (No.1) [1986] 2 All ER 580 at 589 (Eng.) 
 174.  See 679 House of Lord Official Report (5th series), Report Column: GC13, 27 Feb. 2006.  
 175.  Smith v. Croft (No.1) [1986] 2 All ER 580 (Eng.) 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 598. 
 180.  See generally id.; Wallersteiner v. Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 All ER 849 (Eng.) 
 181.  See generally Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and 
Long-Term Firm Performance, 27  J. CORP. L. 231 (2002). 
 182.  REISBERG, supra note 9, at 238. 
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The principle derived from Wallersteiner has been embedded in statutes. 183  It is 
stipulated that “the court may order the company … for the benefit of which a derivative 
claim is brought to indemnify the claimant against liability for costs incurred in the 
permission application or in the derivative claim or both.”184 However, it has not promoted 
the enforcement and frequency of application of this mechanism. In general terms, it is argued 
by Keay that in only two of the eight cases in which the shareholder has been successful under 
the statutory regime has the Court granted costs with limits.185 He proposed a more relaxed 
attitude in terms of awarding an indemnity in relation to the costs of shareholders who 
successfully obtain permission to continue a derivative action and criticized the current 
scheme for being “harsh.”186 
The question then arises of whether the English approach should be adopted in China. 
Meng views the indemnity order positively and considers it a “feasible scheme for funding 
shareholders in China,” which could be “fairly conveniently achieved” by order of the court 
without introducing new reforms to the current legal structure.187 It is argued that two aspects 
need to be considered, including whether a case is “a reasonable case for the minority 
shareholder to bring at the expense (eventually) of the company,” and whether the court is 
convinced that claimant has any real prospect of success.188 Without additional or detailed 
guidelines for the claimant and court to follow, the application of the rule needs to be sought 
with the discretion of the judge.  
Provision IV makes it clear that the company should indemnify “reasonable expenses” 
for cases where the claims are fully or partially supported by the court..189 However, the 
enforcement measure of this principle is unclear; i.e. it is unclear whether this should be 
performed through an indemnity order. Other than the Provision, current legislation and rules 
of court fail to give any clear and enforceable instruction to the shareholder as to what they 
should do or the criteria for their litigation being funded by the company. 
Without a transparent legislative process and public scrutiny, it is uncertain whether the 
Supreme Court’s provision and the UK approach share the same legislative aims and 
rationale. However, the scope of application in the Provisions is actually narrower than the 
UK approach. Moreover, the granting of indemnity orders in the UK is based on rigorous and 
individualized multiple-tier tests including the “good faith test.” the “financial need test,” plus 
“considerable care” exercised by the Court.190 It could be rather difficult to introduce such 
rules in a civil law jurisdiction, especially one with an immature juridical system and limited 
judicial resources. It is also contradictory to arguments in favor of establishing a more 
 
 183.  See Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132, Sch. 1(15) rule 12A (UK). 
 184.  Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132, Pt 19(II), rule 19.9E (UK). 
 185.  Andrew Keay, Assessing Rethinking the Statutory Scheme for Derivative Action under the Companies Act 
2006, 16 J. CORP. L. STUD. 39, 57 (2016). 
 186.  Id. at 57–58. 
 187.  Meng, supra note 94, at 29–30. 
 188.  Id. at 30. 
 189.  Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shiyong  <zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongsi fa > ruogan wenti de 
guiding (si) (最高人民法院关于适用＜中华人民共和国公司法＞若干问题的规定(四)) [Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues about the Application of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (IV)], art. 26. 
 190.  See Smith v. Croft (No.1) [1986] 2 B.C.C. 99010 at 99014 (Eng.) (explaining that “where a shareholder 
has in good faith and on reasonable grounds sued as plaintiff in a minority shareholder’s action . . . and which it 
would have been reasonable for an independent board of directors to bring in the company’s name, it would, I 
think, clearly be a proper exercise of judicial discretion to order the company to pay the plaintiff’s costs.”). 
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enabling legal environment for shareholders—especially those in JSLCs—to pursue 
derivative actions.  
Therefore, the transplant should also be subject to more rigorous assessment of its 
fitness with a comprehensive consideration of other path dependence factors, including a 
number of issues such as overburdened court systems, limited judicial resources, judges’ 
skills and knowledge, 191  the limited knowledge of shareholders as natural persons, and 
information asymmetries between minority and institutional shareholders. The transplants in 
China in general, not just in the area discussed this article, are plagued by judicial corruption, 
incompetence, and inefficiency.192 In fact, many civil servants are described as judges in 
China but work in administrative roles.193 Problems such as the lack of expertise and the 
absence of case law to help judges means derivative actions in China are far from useful when 
compared with ordinary suits. The guiding cases system was introduced as a novel attempt to 
benefit from the advantages of both the common law and civil systems. It has the potential to 
bring some benefits by enhancing the faith of the masses in the judiciary in China. 194 
However, guiding cases are nothing more than administrative instructions presented in the 
form of cases.195  It is hard to obtain instruction in the case of litigation costs, which vary 
significantly between individual cases with a heavy involvement of directors’ discretion.  
The author’s hesitation extends to the scenario in Hong Kong, a jurisdiction with similar 
history, tradition, culture, and geographical location to China.  Courts there have yet to 
approve any orders indemnifying an applicant for the costs incurred in a statutory derivative 
action.196 
The considerable extent of corruption in China’s judicial system should be of 
instrumental concern in assessing the possibility of adopting an indemnity order system. 
Evidence has shown that most jurisdictions in developing countries suffer from democratic 
or authoritarian judicial corruption and parochialism.197 The judicial discretion of judges in 
China always leads to opportunity for corruption, especially in terms of decisions in relation 
to fees.198  
 
 191.  See Ting Gong, Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in Contemporary 
China, 4 CHINA REV. 33, 35 (2004) (discussing factors affecting judicial corruption in China); see generally 
Weixia Gu, The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation: Quo Vadis Chinese Courts? 1 CHINESE J. 
COMP. L. 303 (2013) (discussing current shortcomings and prior reform efforts within the Chinese judiciary). 
 192.  See Gu, supra note 191, at 313 (explaining that the Chinese judiciary struggles with corruption, “the slow 
pace in processing cases, [and] the lack of professional judges.”). 
 193.  Judging Judges, THE ECONOMIST (Sep. 24, 2015),  https://www.economist.com 
/china/2015/09/24/judging-judges. 
 194.  Ruiyi Li, Case-law adopted by China?, UK CONST. L. ASS’N (Jan. 26, 2012), 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/01/26/ruiyi-li-case-law-adopted-by-china/. 
 195.  Jinting Deng, The Guiding Case System in Mainland China, 10 FRONTIERS L. CHINA 1 (2015) 
 196.  Felix E. Mezzanotte, The Unconvincing Rise of the Statutory Derivative Action in Hong Kong: Evidence 
from its First 10 Years of Enforcement, 17 J. CORP. L. STUD. 469, 471 (2017). 
 197.  See Keith E. Henderson, Halfway Home and a Long Way to Go: China’s Rule of Law Evolution and the 
Global Road to Judicial Independence, Judicial Impartiality and Judicial Integrity, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN 
CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION 23, 32 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010) (analyzing 
endemic judicial corruption in developing states); see also Jacques deLisle, Law in the China Model 2.0: Legality, 
Developmentalism and Leninism under Xi Jinping, 26 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 68 (2017) (discussing corruption as a 
development-challenging threat). 
 198.  See Gong, supra note 191, at 33; see also Margaret Woo, Law and Discretion in the Contemporary 
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IV. FINDING THE MOST SUITABLE APPROACH FOR CHINA: AN OPTION THAT 
SHOULD INCLUDE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL FACTORS 
The new Company Law contains no provisions on funding issues related to derivative 
action. Provision IV makes indemnity possible for shareholders who bring derivative actions 
directly or where their actions are supported fully or partially by the Court.199 Considering 
the fundamentally disadvantaged position of shareholders—especially minority shareholders 
in JSLCs who suffer from information asymmetry and weak bargaining power—incentives 
should be given to shareholders to bring derivative actions. In terms of suggestions for how 
to make derivative action possible and effective while not triggering nuisance lawsuits, 
different proposals have been put forward for the reform of litigation fees and attorneys’ fees 
for derivative actions. Issues related to costs are largely responsible for the relative 
unpopularity of statutory derivative actions. Reform suggestions should be considered 
carefully in relation to the nature of derivative action as a lawsuit instigated by shareholders 
on behalf of the company with indirect and uncertain benefits for claimant shareholders. 
Commentators have been using different methodologies with diverse focuses that have 
led to different proposals. Clarke and Howson claimed that it is the losing party who should 
be responsible for the attorneys’ fee.200 Huang proposes that the US model is more suitable 
for China due to the effectiveness of contingency fee arrangements in encouraging derivative 
action in JSLCs and the unfitness of the ‘indemnity order’ as the leave of the court is not 
required in China.201 Mao proposed the adoption of the Japanese model in order to achieve 
multiple goals, including encouraging minority shareholders to bring derivative actions on 
behalf of the company and mitigating litigation risks and costs.202 The approaches of these 
proposals are largely established as a legal transplant that is a smart way of choosing to forge 
a legal model.203 From our discussions of the importance of legal costs in relation to derivative 
actions in the context of the legislative experiences of the US, the UK and Japan, it seems 
that a simple transplant should not be the way forward. Just like companies’ decisions on 
whether to “make or buy” certain raw materials,204 it may be more efficient and rational to 
 
Chinese Courts, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 581 (1999) (describing how China’s commitment to domestic structural 
reforms within the nation’s courts has been tested by the problem of judicial corruption); Chris X. Lin, A Quiet 
Revolution: An Overview of China’s Judicial Reform, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 256 (2003) (detailing how 
rampant judicial corruption has motivated reform movements). 
 199.  Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shiyong  <zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongsi fa > ruogan wenti de 
guiding (si) (最高人民法院关于适用＜中华人民共和国公司法＞若干问题的规定(四)) [Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues about the Application of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (IV)], art. 26. 
 200.  Donald Clarke & Nicholas Calcina Howson, Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative 
Action in the People’s Republic of China, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 243, 291–92 (Dan W. Puchniak, Harald Baum, and Michael Ewing-Chow eds., 2012). 
 201.  Huang, supra note 7, at 653 (2012). 
 202.  WENQING MAO (毛文清), JUNHENG SHIJIAOXIA DE GUDONG DAIBIAO SUSONG YANJIU (均衡视角下的股
东代表诉讼研究）[A STUDY ON SHAREHOLDER REPRESENTATIVE ACTION FROM AN EQUILIBRIUM PERSPECTIVE]  
157 (2012). 
 203.  MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 212–13 (1st ed. 2014). 
 204.  Ralf Michaels, Make or Buy—A Public Market fort Legal Transplants?, in REGULATORY COMPETITION 
IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE 27 (Horst Eidenmuller ed., Beck / Hart / Nomos, 2013); Ralf Michaels, ‘One Size 
Can Fit All’—Some Heretical Thought on the Mass Production of Legal Transplants, in ORDER FROM TRANSFER: 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL  DESIGN AND LEGAL CULTURE 56 (Gunter Frankenberg ed., 2013). 
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adopt a hybrid approach, adopting a model in China that is partly imported from other 
jurisdictions and then adapted to fit the Chinese context. 
The legal cost issue should be regulated through a mechanism including stipulations for 
litigation costs that include court fees, which may be further divided into filing fees, other 
litigation costs, and attorneys’ fees. The selection of the most appropriate model should rest 
on the status quo of the judicial system, together with the weakness and reform necessity of 
the derivative action mechanism in China. Moreover, it is important to embed such elements 
as the nature of the claimants and the current state of the legal profession in China.  
As for filing fees, as a cost that the litigant needs to pay in advance, a reform should 
also be adopted in China to address the lack of incentives that underlies the reluctance of 
shareholders in JSLCs to bring derivative actions. This could be done by introducing a fixed 
charge as the litigation cost. This is because the amount of damages to be paid to the suing 
shareholder is normally difficult to determine, while a fixed charge is predictable and 
shareholder-friendly. The trajectory of the increasing number of derivative actions in Japan205 
may be echoed in China by enhancing the popularity and effectiveness of the derivative action 
system.  
It is difficult to offer an exact figure, which may sound arbitrary, without empirical 
support. 206  Nevertheless, the introduction of a fixed fee will achieve dual goals—first, 
encouraging sincere and legitimate shareholders to bring healthy derivative actions in the 
interests of companies. Just as West argued in the context of Japan, the change in the nature 
of derivative actions to involve a nominal fixed stamp fee (a reduction in most cases) explains 
“much of the increase in cases filed [of derivative action]”.207 However, this fee may be 
subject to change due to the inflation and well-documented obstacle of insufficient court 
funding in China in order to achieve the rule of law.208 Second, it would support claims that 
shareholders’ benefits from derivative actions are truly “incalculable.” It is accurate, rational 
and consistent with respect to the nature of the derivative action mechanism itself, since 
shareholders are only entitled to the benefits of a successful litigation in percentage terms, 
indirectly, and with very vague causal links between the benefit to shareholders and the claims 
of the lawsuits. The pro rata benefits that shareholders may enjoy are too difficult to quantify 
and enumerate. The American Law Institute validates the derivative action mechanism as an 
outstanding mechanism for shareholder remedy with virtually incalculable, or at least no 
 
 205.  See Masafumi Nakahigashi & Dan W. Puchniak, Land of the Rising Derivative Action: Revisiting 
Irrationality to Understand Japan’s Unreluctant Shareholder Litigate, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 128, 129 (Dan W. Puchniak, Harald Baum & Michael Ewing-Chow 
eds., 2012) (explaining the dramatic increase in derivative actions in Japan). 
 206.  A bold attempt on reform could be a fee of RMB 780 Yuan (equivalent to 13,000 Yen) for LLCs. A 
higher fee should probably be used for JSLCs or claims with very high targets (capped at probably 100,00 Yuan 
which is equivalent to 1.6 million Yen) since the monetary claims are likely to be much higher in value. This is due 
to the size of the companies, the destructive nature of directors’ dereliction of duty, and their complicity in these 
cases. Due to the threshold of 1% ownership for 180 days in JSLCs, a higher fee than RMB 780 Yuan should not 
put companies under any pressure. 
 207.  Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 352–53 
(2001). 
 208.  Xin He, Zhongguo fayuan de caizheng buzu yu sifa fubai (中国法院的财政不足与司法腐败) [Lack of 
Financial Resources and Judicial Corruption in Chinese Courts], 21st Century Rev. 12–23 (February 2008). 
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readily quantifiable, deterrent effect.209 In the author’s opinion, it is fundamentally important 
to clarify the nature of derivative action claims, specifying that all derivative actions are 
defined as “incalculable” claims in the national company law legislation.  
In terms of attorneys’ fees, it would be feasible but complicated to introduce the US 
model in China, with the “exceptional nature of the economic incentives”210 provided within 
the derivative action regime, due to the fact that attorneys are regarded as entrepreneurs and 
derivative suits are seen as entrepreneurial litigation. It is argued that there are two important, 
but rather difficult, prerequisites for the contingency fee arrangement to work effectively in 
China: a common fund principle and a substantial benefit test. A well understood and 
reformed approach needs to be introduced in China gradually, and it is always quicker to test 
ideas at the regional level. As a starting point, it may be valuable to explore the possibilities 
of introducing localized regulatory measures to deal with the issues surrounding litigation 
fees. Areas that have been popular for derivative actions based on the historical cases after 
the enforcement of Section 151 of Chinese Company Law would be a good start, such as 
Shanghai City, Beijing City, Zhejiang Province, Jiangsu Province, and Guangdong 
Province.211 Such a localized approach may give local authorities flexibility in designing or 
making attempts to develop a workable approach to funding in derivative actions. Local 
courts have always seemed to be more proactive in awarding legal fee reimbursement for 
successful claimants.  
In fact, the judicial opinions promulgated by local courts always contain rules to the 
effect of contingent fees. For example, it is suggested by the Civil Division of the High 
People’s Court of Shanghai that a shareholder who successfully brings a lawsuit on behalf of 
a company should be indemnified for reasonable litigation costs.212 The Jiangsu High People's 
Court has issued rules to make indemnifying the claimants possible if they wish to bring a 
derivative litigation.213 The fee-oriented requirement issued by the Jiangsu High People's 
Court was designed to be more protective, and the rule provided that “if the court supports 
the claimant’s derivative claims, litigation costs should be borne by the claimant and other 
reasonable litigation fees such as the attorney fees and travel costs should be borne by the 
company; if the court does not support the derivative claims, the litigation cost should be paid 
by claimant shareholders; the court partly support the claims, the claimant shareholders and 
the company should bear the cost pro rata.”214 
Of course, these flexibilities also bring uncertainties, which may not resolve the lack of 
incentives for derivative action in China. Furthermore, detailed rules on the nature of benefits, 
 
 209.  See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994) (detailing a survey of issues about derivative actions 
and deterrence); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, An Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance, 48 
BUS. LAW. 1272 (1993) (describing an overview of the book Principles of Corporate Governance). 
 210.  Dan Puchniak, The Derivative Action in Asia: A Complex Reality, 9 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 18 (2013). 
 211.  Shaowei Lin, Derivative Actions in China: Case Analysis, 44 HONG KONG L. J. 621, 642 (2014). 
 212.  2003 Guanyu Shenli Sheji Gongsi Susong Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Chuli Yijian (2003 关于审理涉及公
司诉讼案件若干问题的处理意见) [Opinions on Adjudicating Cases in Relation to Litigation Regarding 
Companies 2003] art. 5 (2) subsec. 4, (Civil Division of the High People’ Court of Shanghai). 
 213. See Jiangsu High People's Court, Jiangsusheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Shiyong Shiyong 
Gongsifa Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Yijian (江苏省高级人民法院关于审理适用使用公司法案件若干问题的意见
) [Opinions on Several Issues in relation to Adjudicating Corporate Disputes of the High People’s Court of Jiangsu 
Province]。 
 214.   Id. art. 78. 
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the triggering point at which a claimant is eligible for compensation, and how to satisfy a 
reasonable or pro rata rate still need further discussion.  
CONCLUSION  
The mechanism of derivative claims has been a topic of interest in China with the 
development of corporate governance, particularly in relation to the corporate reform of SOEs 
and stock market development. The current problem in the Chinese legal system is not the 
abuse of this mechanism. Instead, the real concern is that the mechanism has not reached its 
legitimate potential with limited function, especially for JSLCs.215 A sensible fee arrangement 
is important for a more enforceable mechanism and better corporate governance. 
Notwithstanding the significance of derivative actions in modern China, scholarly work has 
largely overlooked the litigation-related cost of derivative action in this fast-growing nation. 
The existing research recognizes the need for a continuous process of adaptation and 
development, learning appropriately from experience and responding sensitively to local 
conditions. To date, the development of the financial system in China has had unique Chinese 
characteristics, and it has been suggested that this pathway to growth will continue. The lack 
of legal issues on how derivative actions should be funded is a critical failure in the new 
Company Law, considering the lack of incentives for shareholders to bring derivative actions, 
particularly those who are investors in JSLCs. Fee-related issues have been addressed in the 
recent Provision IV. This provision failed to address three important aspects, including fee-
related issues for shareholders whose cases are not supported by the court, funds that could 
be made available for shareholders when they bring litigation rather than paying up-front, and 
the clear scope of the fund that could be indemnified. The scope in Provision IV seems much 
narrower than the court fees stipulated in the Measures on Payment of Litigation 2007.  
Through the discussions of the legal approaches in Japan, US, and UK as three classic 
approaches practiced globally, it is concluded that a fixed fee (as in Japan) and a contingency 
fee supported by a common fund and substantial tests should be the way forward. The 
approach adopted in the UK is neither feasible nor desirable for China due to strict multi-tier 
tests, reliance on judges’ discretion, an underdeveloped judicial environment, and the lack of 
judicial resources in China. The introduction of any reform will be hindered by path-
dependence factors such as Chinese history, culture, the quality and ethics of the legal 
profession, existing legislation, and the positions and information available to shareholders, 
especially minority shareholders in JSLCs.  
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